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FOREWORD
Defenders of intellectual property rights argue
that these rights are justified because creators
and inventors deserve compensation for their
labour, because their ideas and expressions are
their personal property and because the total
amount of creative work and innovation
increases when inventors and creators have a
prospect of generating high income through
the exploitation of their monopoly rights. This
view is not only widely accepted by the general
public, but also enforced through a very effec-
tive international legal framework. And it is
endorsed by most academic researchers and
commentators in this field.
In this essay, I will show that the classical argu-
ments for the justification of private intellec-
tual property rights can be contested, and that
there are many good reasons to abolish intel-
lectual property rights completely in favour of
an intellectual commons where every person
is allowed to use every cultural expression and
invention in whatever way he wishes.
I will first give a short overview of the classical
arguments for the justification of intellectual
property as they are usually stated. We will
then discuss the question of whether the cre-
ator or inventor deserves his de jure monopoly,
by using John Christman’s categories of
income and control rights to analyse property
rights. The aim here is to show that it does not
make sense to create control rights for abstract
objects, as they are not scarce, and that there
is no logical connection between the surplus
which may be generated through income rights
and the labour which has been put into a cul-
tural artefact or an invention, and therefore it
is not justified to grant monopoly rights on the
basis of Lockean natural rights arguments for
self-ownership and the just appropriation of
worldly resources.
As it is possible to reject Christman’s property
rights categories, I will then go on to show on
the basis of Richard Dawkins’ postulation of
the ‘meme’ and Ludwik Fleck’s theory of the
‘thought collective’ that creative processes
should be interpreted as interpersonal or col-
lective processes, and therefore it is not jus-
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tified to grant intellectual property rights to
individuals on the basis of the idea that the
individual who has put labour into the creative
work or the invention should be the one to
whom the contents of the work belong exclu-
sively.
As it is still possible to postulate the utilitarian
argument that intellectual property rights are
just because they increase the amount of cre-
ative works and inventions, I will argue in the
last chapter that, from a libertarian as well as
from an egalitarian point of view, the justifica-
tion of intellectual monopoly rights on utilitar-
ian grounds cannot be maintained. Therefore it
is time to abolish the current global intellectual
property law regime in favour of an intellectual
commons for the good of all human beings and
societies.
Switzerland, Mai 2015
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INTRODUCTION
S ince the development of capitalist soci-eties in the early modern period, thequestion of whether the works of inven-
tors and artists need to be protected by law has
been disputed.1 As we know today, the propo-
nents of such protection have won this dispute
for now and there is a rigorous, globally con-
nected legal framework in place which protects
copyrights, patents, trademarks and trade
secrets under the common term of ‘intellectual
property’ in almost every part of the world. The
common justification for the worldwide legal
framework of intellectual property rights is
based on two premises. First, that there exists
an individual creator of a creative work and
that the creative process which brings up the
creator’s work is primarily based on individual
1. For a history of intellectual property rights see Deazley,
Kretschmer & Bently (2010); Drahos (1996), May (2006), or
Höffner (2010a, 2010b)
labour, and therefore the result of this process
is to be exclusively attributed to the creator;
and second, that without such an exclusive
right to exploit and control their works, cre-
ators would create less because there would be
less monetary incentive to do so, which is bad
for society.
In my thesis I will argue that these premises
are false because creative processes have to be
understood as collective processes, and that
even if we believe that private property as such
is essential for personal freedom, there is no
foundation for the exclusive appropriation of
the results of human creativity by individuals.
In fact, I will argue that we should abandon
the focus on the individual creator altogether
and come to a concept whereby not only ideas,
but expressions and all the results of creative
cultural processes are seen as common goods,
accessible by everyone without restrictions. I
will argue not only that the concept of an indi-
vidual creator can be contested, but also that
there are few grounds for utilitarian arguments
in favour of intellectual property rights even if
we still believe in the individual creator.
My work here is about intellectual property
rights in a wide sense, but focuses mostly on
one of its branches: ‘copyright’ – even though
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I do refer to patents as well, where it seems
appropriate to do so. I will not write about
trademark rights in this work, as I do not con-
sider them as being rights that primarily grant
exclusive exploitation of creative works, but
rather as rights which make sure a product or
an organisation is clearly identifiable. This
said, it should be possible to categorise trade-
mark rights under competition law rather than
under intellectual rights, but I will not discuss
this special issue in this paper any further. So,
in this essay, the term ‘intellectual property’
means mainly copyright and patents. It is true
that intellectual property rights do not share
the same attributes in every case. But they have
one important similarity. They are about prop-
erty rights over abstract objects,2 which makes
them in some aspects fundamentally different
from general property rights whose subjects
are physical objects. I will not give an overview
of the history of the development of intellectual
property rights, as there are plenty of such
overviews available,3 but I would like to point
out here that the current intellectual property
2. For a detailed examination of the difference between abstract
and physical objects concerning property rights see Drahos
(1996:6ff).
3. See Boldrin (2008), Boyle (2008), Deazley (2010), Dommann
(2014), Drahos (1996), Höffner (2010), May (2006), Moser
(2013),
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rights regime is the result of a historical and
political process which is driven mostly by the
economic interests of a minority of for-profit
organisations in Western societies. The most
recent step in the global enforcement of private
intellectual property rights, the implementa-
tion of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) from the GATT Uruguay round of
1994, is an especially good example of the way
in which powerful monetary interests have
shaped the global legal framework and with
it the public perception of intellectual prop-
erty. Therefore one should have in mind, when
reading this text, that the current established
way of looking at intellectual property in our
time is not the only possible way, and it
need not to be considered the best way just
because of the fact that it has become so widely
accepted.
I will start in Chapter One with a short
overview of the three most important classical
justifications for intellectual property rights.
They are used in combination by most propo-
nents of the current global intellectual prop-
erty rights legal framework. All three justifica-
tions are challenged in this essay. The natural
law and the personality-based justifications are
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focused around the individual creator, and will
be discussed in Chapters Two and Three. They
essentially assert that, because human beings
ought to be free creatures, they also should
have exclusive and absolute rights to their own
expressions. And as individuals own them-
selves, it is also said – controversially though –
by self-ownership supporters, they deserve the
fruits of their labour. As human beings have
a moral right to develop their personality they
must have an exclusive right to their creative
output, which is part of their individual exis-
tence. I will question these assertions and will
discuss how the creative process can be per-
ceived as an interpersonal or collective process
rather than something which should be mainly
attributed to individuals. I will do this on the
basis of Richard Dawkins’ concept of the meme
and with reference to Ludwik Fleck’s idea of
the thought collective in scientific communi-
ties. I am not, as it may appear, questioning
individual freedom. The abolition of private
intellectual property rights would create more
opportunities for more people to live their lives
according to their needs and wishes. In other
words, it would probably lead to more freedom
and more justice. In Chapter Four we will dis-
cuss the utilitarian justifications. I will argue
that from a libertarian, as well as from an egal-
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itarian point of view, the abolition of intellec-
tual property rights would not worsen the eco-
nomic situation either for society as a whole or
for the worst-off. We will see how on utilitar-
ian considerations, as well as to maintain max-
imum personal freedom, it makes more sense
for a society to fully abandon the concept of
intellectual property and allow everyone to use
and benefit from all expressions, cultural arte-
facts and inventions equally without restric-
tions. An important effect of such a system
would be that economic rewards would be
given for innovation and not just for copying.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS COMMON
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1. THE CLASSICAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
T he debate about the justification ofintellectual property rights is as long-standing as these rights have been
implemented under the jurisdictions of West-
ern societies. Over time, three classical justifi-
cations have been developed, which are often
used in combination to argue in favour of intel-
lectual property rights. One characteristic of
these rights is that they grant monopoly rights
for the economic exploitation of a creative
work or an invention for a certain time period.
But interestingly, it seems to be clear, even for
the strongest proponent of such monopoly
rights, that some restrictions to the execution
of intellectual property rights have to be set. In
this part I will give a short overview of these
classical justifications and their widely
accepted restrictions in modern societies. We
have to examine these justifications partly to
set the focus of this work and partly to illus-
trate the challenges each justification faces
even in its pure form, not to mention in the
combinations in which they are often used.
JUSTIFICATION BY NATURAL LAW
The most common and most important justi-
fication starts with Locke’s natural law justifi-
cation for appropriation of worldly resources.
Locke starts with his important claim for self-
ownership, from which he concludes that a
person not only owns himself, but also the
results of his work, as long as he leaves enough
and as good for others (Locke 2005 [1690]:
Chapter V). The concept of self-ownership and
the just appropriation of natural resources is
challenged by many egalitarian philosophers
(e.g. Cohen 1995) and in libertarian philosophy
it is disputed whether self-ownership can be
conceived of as compatible with the idea that
natural resources should be distributed in
some egalitarian way (Vallentyne 2000). I will
not question the self-ownership thesis itself in
this work, but will show that even if we rely
on it, we cannot derive any intellectual prop-
erty rights from it. Locke asserts that the inter-
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mingling of the self-owner’s labour with nat-
ural resources makes the result of this work his
property. And even if this ‘mixing’ metaphor
has generated a lot of critics, it has remained
one of the most-used arguments for the jus-
tification of the appropriation of natural
resources and the results of creative processes.1
The natural law argument for intellectual prop-
erty then states that a creative work is the
result of the author’s labour, therefore he is the
only owner and the one who deserves to bene-
fit from it exclusively.
If we want to challenge the natural law justifi-
cation while holding the self-ownership thesis
to be true, we could try to show that the Lock-
ean proviso, which requires the appropriator
to take only as much as leaves enough for oth-
ers, can be used to challenge intellectual prop-
erty rights because with monopoly rights, there
is nothing left for others. I will not do so in
this essay.2 I will rather question in Chapter
Three the assumption that creative works or
inventions are primarily the results of the cre-
ator’s or inventor’s labour and that therefore,
the results should be attributed to him alone.
But before this I will show, with the help of
1. See for example Moore (2012)
2. For a discussion of this issue see Moore (2012)
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John Christman’s distinction between income
rights and control rights, that there is no log-
ical connection between the amount of labour
one has put into a piece of work and the poten-
tial surplus he may generate in the market. In
other words, one can hold that human agents
are still full self-owners even if there are no
intellectual property rights granted to them, as
these monopoly rights are neither bound to
their self-ownership nor to their labour, but
simply provide them a privilege to reap a sur-
plus from a market. Self-ownership is not
affected if a society does not grant intellectual
property rights to its members. Self-owners
still fully own themselves even without intel-
lectual property rights, as one cannot say that
one is forced to do something against his will
without these rights. He can decide whether or
not to work on a piece of art or on an inven-
tion freely, and he can further use his and oth-
ers’ work freely to do whatever he wants. He
can create new physical objects for example,
for which he will be granted all property rights
as with any other object. He can create services
based on his and all other creative works or
inventions he knows about. We will come back
to this aspect in Chapters Two and Four.
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UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATION
Another important justification is the utilitar-
ian or consequentialist argument for intellec-
tual property rights. It asserts that even if the
natural law argument can be challenged, it is
still the case that without the monetary incen-
tives which come with the monopoly rights
from intellectual property, rational agents
would not produce creative works in the same
amount as with these advantages. The more
creative works are produced, the better for any
society. Therefore if monopoly rights can
increase the amount of creative works, they are
justified. The U.S. Constitution, which includes
a special clause for copyright and patent law
legitimation, is a good example of how deeply
embedded this view actually is, as it empowers
the United States Congress ‘To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.’3 This utilitarian justification
is also sometimes used in public discussions
of intellectual property rights to construct a
moral entitlement (Waldron, 1992:851). For
economic reasons we have to give rewards in
the form of monopoly rights to authors and
3. U.S. Constitution Art I, §8, Cl. 8
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inventors, as the utilitarian argument says. But
rewards are usually considered to be given to
those who have deserved them; therefore
authors and inventors deserve their monopoly
rights. This argument is confusing indeed, as
it connects an economic with a moral state-
ment, but it is very common in public political
debates about intellectual property rights.
The premise in the utilitarian arguments, that
creative or scientific works need exclusive
exploitation rights to bring them into exis-
tence, is in fact an empirical assertion and
there is much evidence that it is false. Open
source software and many other open knowl-
edge movements, the fashion business, and the
rich heritage of traditional culture all over the
world are just three examples where mankind
has generated a huge creative output without
the promise of exclusive exploitation rights.
But, as proponents of intellectual property
rights would say, it is not a question of whether
creative work would happen without these
rights, but that less creative output would be
the result. We will discuss these considerations
in Chapter Four of this paper when we talk
about the just society with intellectual com-
mons.
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JUSTIFICATION BY PERSONALITY
RIGHTS
In continental Europe, copyright law contains
more than just economic aspects such as the
exclusive right to the exploitation of the work.4
In France these additional rights are called ‘le
droit d’auteur’ and in Germany they talk about
‘Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechte.’ The author in
France and the person in Germany are the
focus of these rights, not just the ‘copy’ of the
work. These rights, which are called ‘moral
rights’ in international copyright law, aim to
protect the personal rather than simply the
economic interests of an author. They include
the right of attribution, the right of integrity,
the right of disclosure and the right of with-
drawal. These rights are said to be justified
because creative works are ‘almost universally
understood to be an extension of the author’s
personhood’ (Rigamonti 2006:355-356),
hence the name personality rights justifica-
tion.5
The personality rights justification derives
mainly from the works of Kant and Hegel,6 but
4. See also Drahos (1996:88)
5. The term personality rights is also used by Moore (2011)
6. Although the usual interpretation of Hegel’s account is dis-
puted by Schroeder (2006) it remains an important basis for
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS COMMON
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for the sake of simplicity I will focus on Kant
in this work. For Kant, copyright for books has
no primary connection to the work but to the
author’s person, because what is written are
the thoughts owned by the author, and they
cannot be taken by someone else:
“This right of the author is, however, not a
right to the object, that is, to the copy (for its
owner is certainly entitled to, say, burn it in
front of the author); rather, it is an innate
right, invested in his own person, entitling him
to prevent anyone else from presenting him as
speaking to the public without his consent – a
consent which cannot be taken for granted by
any means, since he has already conceded it to
someone [to his publisher].” (Kant 2014 [1785])
For Kant the words and thoughts of a person
are a fundamental part of his personality and
therefore it seems obvious to him that they are
owned exclusively by the author. In his essay
‘Answering the Question: What is Enlighten-
ment?’ we can see that his concern about the
authorship of written words is not the own-
ership of the copy but the fact that writing is
using one’s reason in public: “By the public use
the personality rights justification until today. For an account
of an Hegelian justification of intellectual property rights see
Priya (2008).
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of one’s reason I understand the use which
a person makes of it as a scholar before the
reading public” (Kant 1963 [1784]). This helps
us to understand why he has a different view
on other works of art, like paintings and sculp-
tures, where everyone, according to Kant, is
allowed to make copies and bring them into the
market. Because these kinds of works are not
the creator’s ‘Rede’ (opera),
“A work of art, on the other hand, since it is
an object, may be copied and re-casted from
a copy of it, and the copies thus made of it
may be publicly circulated without requiring
the consent of the author of the original or of
those whom the latter used as the executors of
his ideas.” (Kant 2014 [1785])
So Kant’s argument against the nonconsensual
reprinting of books cannot be seen as a general
argument for personality rights for creators of
all kinds. His concern is that thinking is what
constitutes a person and speaking is the artic-
ulation of one’s own thoughts, and writing is
nothing other than speaking to the reading
public. To paint or compose a piece of music
is not making public use of one’s reason. It
is the reasoning citizen he has in mind, not
the artist. Kant does not argue for intellectual
property as such, but for the right of the author
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS COMMON
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to protect his speech, his name and his person.
Kant’s account has been very influential in the
creation of so-called ‘moral rights’ in copyright
law and it is used to assert that a piece of work
is also to be understood as an integral part of
the creator’s personality. But as we will dis-
cover in Chapter Three, a creative work is more
accurately the result of a collective process
rather than the effort of a single individual,
and therefore it cannot be claimed as an exten-
sion of the personhood of a supposed individ-
ual creator.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS RESTRICTIONS
When we read the arguments for intellectual
property rights above, it seems rather strange
that we also have restrictions such as “fair use”
for these rights in most legal frameworks for
intellectual property rights. As we have seen,
it looks like all these arguments favour an
absoluteness of such monopoly rights. The cre-
ator has deserved them, and they are good for
the prosperity of all. So why, then, have we
implemented restrictions in these intellectual
property rights? The reason for these restric-
tions is that if they did not exist, the creative
process would come to an end, which is also
a clue that its collective aspects are important.
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If intellectual property rights were interpreted
as absolute rights, it is hard to imagine how
innovation would happen. Imitation and copy-
ing are the basis for cultural evolution and tra-
dition (Blackmore 1999:23ff). If the first per-
son who created a roof had thereby obtained
never ending exclusive rights to his construc-
tion, we might still be living in caves. If human
beings were not allowed to tell each other sto-
ries about Zeus, Odysseus and other mytholog-
ical heroes, like we are nowadays not allowed
to tell stories about Luke Skywalker, Super-
man, Harry Potter and all the other heroes of
our time, we would miss a huge part of our cul-
tural heritage. Yes, we are still allowed to sit
together around a fire and tell a story about
Spider-Man, but this is not how storytelling
as a cultural habit works today. In the digital
age we tell stories with online videos, with blog
posts or other social media activities. They are
private in the sense that they are generally seen
by just a few persons from the social network
of the storyteller. But they are at the same time
publicly available for potentially millions of
viewers, which is why the rights holders think
such ways of storytelling must not be allowed
without monetary compensation.
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All countries with intellectual property laws
have included restrictions to the intellectual
property rights, such as that after a period of
time, a piece of creative work will become part
of the public domain, that a patent only lasts
for a certain number of years, or that academic
libraries are allowed to make copies for their
staff and students, and so on. The justification
for these restrictions is based on utilitarian or
consequentialist grounds. As there is a public
interest in the dissemination of ideas and in
innovation and creativity, private intellectual
property rights need to be constrained. The
fact that we need these restrictions gives a hint,
that there could be something wrong with the
absoluteness with which the classical justifica-
tions for intellectual property rights are usually
defended. I will not further discuss the justi-
fication for these restrictions here; as I argue
for the abolition of intellectual property rights,
such restrictions would also be obsolete.
I have given a short overview in this first chap-
ter of how intellectual property rights are usu-
ally justified, and where in this essay these jus-
tifications are challenged. We will start in the
next chapter with the natural law justification,
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by analysing intellectual property with the help
of John Christman’s distinction between con-
trol rights and income rights.
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2. CONTROL RIGHTS
AND INCOME RIGHTS,
OR DOES THE
CREATOR DESERVE
HIS DE JURE
MONOPOLY?
I n his 1991 paper ‘Self-Ownership, Equality,and the Structure of Property Rights’, JohnChristman argues that to analyse property
rights, it is necessary to split these rights into
two distinct categories of rights (1991:28ff). In
one category are what he calls control rights,
and in the other the bundle of income rights.1
Control rights includes the “rights to use, pos-
sess, manage property, and the right to the
capital (rights to transmit, alienate, or
1. Michael Otsuka makes a similar distinction (Otsuka,
1998:69-70), but his income rights are not of the same kind as
Christman’s. Otsuka’s income includes the income from the
capital whereas Christman’s income contains only the surplus
which may be realised from a transaction.
destroy),” whereas income rights concern the
right to the income from the asset (Christman,
1991:29). I will show in this chapter first that
the income in Christman’s sense which can be
generated from a transaction has nothing to do
with the labour which someone has put into a
product, and therefore monopoly rights to gen-
erate a higher income from a market cannot be
justified by the natural law argument; and sec-
ond that control rights do not make sense for
abstract objects because they are not scarce.
Christman brings up the control/income rights
distinction as an answer to the intriguing self-
ownership argument, which claims that every
person owns herself, and therefore also owns
– with the meaning of having all the property
rights over – the results of her own body, skills
and labour (Christman, 1991:28). The concep-
tual distinction between these two groups of
rights lies in the nature of the environmental
differences which are necessary for a person
to be able to execute these rights. In simple
words, to execute control rights, the existence
of someone else is not needed, but I cannot
execute my income rights without at least one
other person who is involved in the transac-
tion. We could also say there is no income from
property without society. It is important to
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understand the character of income in Christ-
man’s argument. He does not count the con-
sumption of capital among income rights;
rather it is part of the control rights. Income
is the surplus of a transaction, which can only
be realised because markets exist and because
they are in reality never perfect. In a perfect
market, the realised prices would not be higher
than the production costs, and there would
therefore be no income in Christman’s sense,
only asset liquidation. For example, if I plant
an apple-tree on my own property with my own
labour and then eat the apples from my tree,
I do not realise income rights but rights from
the capital of my tree. Only if I am going to sell
some of my apples in the market do I realise
a surplus, with the difference between my
investment, or costs, and what I get, being
counted as “income” in Christman’s sense. The
main reason for Christman making this dis-
tinction is to support the left-libertarian view
that redistribution of income can be compat-
ible with self-ownership concepts.2 I am not
discussing whether it is just to redistribute
income here, but I will use Christman’s model
to show that the income which may be realised
from intellectual property rights has no logical
2. Michael Otsuka (1998) and others aim for the same goal. For
an overview see Steiner (2000).
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connection to the labour which has been put
into a creative work or an invention. This is
important because labour is a basic component
of the natural law justification, as we have seen
in Chapter One. Another relevant aspect of
Christman’s proposition is that he does not dis-
cuss whether private property as such can be
justified, but says that we have to look at the
concept of private property in a more complex
way than is usually done:
“Instead of asking whether private property
per se can be justified, we should ask whether,
on one hand, control rights can be justified
(and what scope they should have and what
objects they should cover) and, on the other,
whether and what sort of income rights can be
defended” (Christman, 1991:37)
There are no property rights as such; there are
control rights and income rights as we have
seen above.3 In most cases, the principal pro-
tagonists in both current and historical politi-
cal debates about intellectual property in gen-
eral, and copyright laws in particular, claim
total control and total income rights for the
creator.4 In fact, the whole body of interna-
3. There are also other concepts of property which are not dis-
cussed in this essay, for more information see for example
Breakey (2012)
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tional copyright law is based on this assump-
tion.5 There are a few limitations and excep-
tions in copyright law, such as fair use in the
United States, but even these are based on the
assumption that the creator shall in principle
have full control and income rights on his intel-
lectual property. The intellectual property
rights restrictions are seen as a necessary evil.
INCOME RIGHTS
Let us first examine the income rights claim
from intellectual property owners, especially
from the proponents6 of the current interna-
tional copyright law legal framework. Later in
this section we will analyse control rights. As
we have seen in the section about the classical
arguments for intellectual property rights
4. In German the word “Urheber” includes not only authors of
texts, but every type of creator of any cultural expression, like
music composers, painters, photographers, and so on. I will
use the English words “creator” and “author” both as transla-
tions for “Urheber”
5. See for example the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works or the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
6. With ‘proponents of intellectual property rights’ in this essay I
mean the group of organisations and individuals who are
arguing in favour of a restrictive international legal frame-
work for the protection of intellectual property rights. See also
Drahos (1996) (2002).
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above, it is posited as being almost common
sense that the creator of any cultural piece of
work deserves monopoly rights over the
exploitation of his work. This means that the
author shall have full income rights from his
‘intellectual property.’ This claim is usually
based on the natural law justification with ref-
erence to John Locke as outlined in Chapter
One, and therefore it is bound mainly to the
idea that the creator has put labour into his
work for which he deserves to be the exclusive
beneficiary. What Christman shows is that an
‘income’ from the surplus can only be realised
if there exists a market infrastructure. This
means that the possibility of an income has
less to do with the creator’s work than the pro-
ponents of intellectual property rights usually
claim. If there is no market, or at the very least
one other person who is willing to be part of a
transaction, there is no income to be realised.
The actual real-world market situation works
like this: most of the surplus that can be
realised on a market transaction is allocated to
the seller of the good.7 But without the social
infrastructure which makes it possible to find
7. In most jurisdictions there is in fact a value tax which redis-
tributes a small amount of the surplus, but still most income
from the transaction is allocated to only one side of the social
infrastructure.
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a buyer for the transaction to take place, no
income could be generated. It would seem
absurd to most of us to demand that the sur-
plus shall go to the buyer; we accept that it
is fully transferred to the seller. In both situa-
tions, the income is concentrated on only one
side, even if it is indisputable that both sides
are equally necessary to make it happen. Again
it is important to keep in mind that we are only
talking about the surplus here, not about the
capital.
Let us assume a creator has put an effort c into
the creation of his work and wants to realise a
surplus S from it, which means selling it on the
market for c+S. We have to make clear that c
is the capital value of his artwork, which means
the labour he has put into his work is part of
his production costs8, and S the surplus which
he may be able to realise in a market. He can
consume c exclusively because of the control
rights which are – for the sake of the argument
here – granted to him. Even if he lived alone
on an island, he would be able to create and to
consume his piece of art as long as he wishes.
8. The exact monetary value of his labour depends on the
scarcity of the good and can only be evaluated through the
market though. It is calculated as market price P - S - c’,
where c’ means production costs without labour.
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But if he wanted to realise more than the capi-
tal value, he would have to make a transaction
in an imperfect market, and therefore a market
infrastructure is needed to make this transac-
tion possible. From this moment on he is not
solely responsible for the realisation of this
surplus S and therefore cannot claim that he
deserves S because of the labour he needed
to create his work. We could also say that the
amount of the surplus S he may realise in the
market is not logically connected to the labour
he has put into his product. Only the market
mechanism can create a price above his pro-
duction costs. But how much above his pro-
duction costs that price is, has no connection
at all to the amount of labour that he has put
into the work. Even if this price is the result of
the consent of free market participants it is still
true that the only reason the seller can realise
his surplus S is because the market is not per-
fect, and not because he has deserved it accord-
ing to his labour. The surplus which can be
realised depends only on the mere chance that
a particular market situation exists. The labour
is included in the capital, which is not gov-
erned by income rights, but by control rights. I
agree that there may be other reasons, like the
fact that he takes the risk to bring the prod-
uct to the market, which can act as justifica-
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tions for his profit, but these reasons do not
justify monopolies as we will see shortly. And
we have to keep in mind that bringing a prod-
uct into existence is not the same as bringing
it to the market. I can buy apples instead of
planting a tree, which means I did not put my
labour into the apples, but still be able to bring
them to the market. The natural law justifica-
tion of intellectual property rights claims that
the creator has deserved the granted monopoly
not because he brings the product to the mar-
ket, but because he brings it into existence by
his own labour.
Assume that a baker operates in a market
which has only one bakery and 100 customers
for bread, and that the production cost includ-
ing his labour for one loaf is 1 unit. Further
assume that the 100 customers are able to
spend 3 units per day for one loaf. As long
as there is only this one baker in the market
he would be able to sell the bread for 3 units
and make a profit of 2 units per loaf. He does
not realise this profit because he deserves it
according to the labour he put into the 100
loaves of bread, but only because the imperfect
market situation allows him to do so. As soon
as other bakers enter the market, the profit will
fall until the ‘deserved’ price, which is equal to
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production costs, is realised. We can easily see
here that not only for intellectual property but
for all kinds of products, a surplus does not
depend on the labour or other production costs
but only on the particular market situation.
There are several possible objections to the
view that the seller does not deserve the sur-
plus from market transactions. First, one could
say that it is equally true for creative work that
no surplus could be generated if the author did
not create it. Second, even if we accept the fact
that without a market there would be no sur-
plus, it is not evident how that surplus should
be distributed. We could postulate that the cre-
ator should still have a bigger share. Third, if
the surplus ought to be distributed in
some other way, it is not even clear who should
be included in this distribution: only the par-
ties of the particular transaction, all partici-
pants in the market, or all members of the soci-
ety which provides the marketplace? It is right
that there would be no surplus if the author did
not create his work. One could even say that if
there is nothing to sell there is no marketplace
at all. Obviously, markets and goods are both
equally necessary for it to be possible to gener-
ate a surplus.
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I have two replies against these objections.
First, my statement is not that the seller does
not deserve any potential surplus at all. My
point is that one cannot say that a seller
deserves his surplus simply because of the
labour he has put into a product. Let us remind
ourselves that full self-ownership means that
one has full property rights over his body,
skills, talents and the results of his labour.9
This concept of self-ownership is what natural
law justification relies on. It is based on the
assumption that it is not ideas that are owned
by the creator, but expressions, which need
labour to bring them to the world. Opponents
of my view could say then that sellers deserve
their surplus because they take the risk or bur-
den of bringing a product to market. I do not
object to this point. But this does not serve
as a justification of monopoly rights, because
monopolies do not create markets. They hinder
competition, and having competition is consid-
ered to be a main feature of a free market. A
person who enters a market does deserve his
profit for being a market participant as long as
he is not hindering competition. If there are, in
an imagined world without intellectual prop-
erty rights, thousands of shops on the Internet
selling products or services based on the
9. See Vallentyne (2014), Christman (1991), Otsuka (1998)
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newest Harry Potter novel, each of them may
create a surplus on their particular markets.
The ones who are just trying to sell a copy of
the text will probably gain no profit at all as the
cost for distribution is near zero nowadays and
competition will most probably lead to zero
profit. But those who are able to create addi-
tional value can use the text and create new
market situations where they can gain their
profits. The author could create a website for
example, where subscribed members can get
new chapters earlier than anyone else, or could
buy special editions of physical objects she has
created based on her story. Or she could pro-
vide live sessions online, where the fans of the
novel can discuss questions about the contents
of the actual and future stories with her. Of
course, others could do so as well, but it is
likely that the author would get more attention
than just another random seller. Still, competi-
tion will exist not only over copies of the text,
but also over its content. It is possible that
other authors would also write new stories
based on some or all of the characters and loca-
tions from the Harry Potter series, and we can
easily imagine that some of these authors or
stories would be even more successful than the
ones from the ‘original’ author. But all this
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innovation only happens when a competitive
market situation is created. Intellectual prop-
erty rights don’t assist this, they hinder it.
Second, when I question the justification for
intellectual property rights, I am not arguing
for the redistribution of a potential surplus.
The abolition of intellectual property rights
does not mean that profits get redistributed. It
is not that something is taken away from the
creator or innovator in a world without intel-
lectual property. It is only that he would face
competition and therefore probably less profit
and a higher pressure to innovate constantly.
Of course from the point of view of a creator
in our actual political situation, it looks like an
attempt to redistribute his potential income.
But again, as we have seen above and will dis-
cuss more deeply later in the text, it is not that
he has morally deserved his de jure monopoly;
it is just a privilege for which an industry sector
has successfully fought. This situation is com-
parable to the time when the old guild systems
came under pressure. For guild members, it
felt like redistribution, but in fact it was the
termination of a distributive system which was
unjust10 in the first place.
It is also said by proponents of the current
regime that only with copyright protection is it
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possible to bring a book into the book market
for example, or a movie into the movie market.
However, intellectual property rights do not
create markets as we have seen. Rather they
create monopolies where the parties are not
free to choose, as there is only one seller of a
particular creative work or an industrial inven-
tion. If I need one specific paper from a par-
ticular scientist to cite in my work, I cannot
choose to buy another one. I am not ‘free to
choose’11 because books are not apples. Intel-
lectual property rights create de jure monopoly
markets for the respective works. While it is
true that there is also some competition
between different cultural works or inventions
it is also undeniable that there would be much
more competition if monopoly rights were not
granted, which is one of the main reasons why
creators and inventors insist on these rights.
10. Robert Nozick could also argue, that guild systems are just if
they have developed through a cascade of consensual transac-
tions (Nozick, 1974). But they did not develop that way. They
were protected through political power.
11. ‘Free to choose’ is the title of a book and a TV series from the
free-market-economy proponent Milton Friedman. Its con-
tent is based on a lecture series which was intended to be part
of the TV series but was later published under the title “Milton
Friedman Speaks”.
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Intellectual property rights proponents could
argue that without these rights creators and
inventors would also not be able to realise the
capital value from their works, as the competi-
tion would be so high that the prices would be
zero at the end. For example, if the production
costs of a book text (not the book copies) were
100,000 units and the production costs for a
digital copy were zero and there were no copy-
right protection, which means everyone could
sell the copy without paying a share of the pro-
duction costs of the first text, the market price
for a copy would be zero as well, and the author
of the book would not be able to generate the
100,000-unit capital value from the market,
which he has deserved according to the natural
law justification. Temporary monopoly rights
are needed to give the creator and inventor a
chance to generate at least the capital value on
the market. It is not about the surplus, they
would say.
My first reply to this objection is that it is true
that where copying and distribution costs are
zero, it is possible that not even the capital
costs would be recovered from selling copies.
But selling copies is just one possibility to let
people pay for creative works or industrial
products. In a world where copy and distribu-
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tion costs are zero it may just not be possible
anymore to make a profit from selling copies,
like it was not possible at the time when the
technical inventions to create copies had not
arisen. Before the invention of sound record-
ing, for example, it was just not possible to
make a profit with recorded music, and now
it appears that this situation is returning. As
technical inventions evolve market possibili-
ties change. Just as it is no longer possible to
make a living as a movie theater musician who
plays along with silent movies, it may not be
possible anymore to make a living from selling
CD’s. But this did not mean then and does not
mean today that one cannot make a living any-
more from playing music. It is just that one
has to innovate and find new ways to generate
value for potential buyers, as the value for
copies of cultural artefacts for music lovers has
vanished the same way as the value for play-
along musicians for movie theatres.
The second answer is that there is no evidence
that the creator or inventor cannot realise his
capital value when he faces competition in
every case. He may have the advantage of being
the first mover, or he may be able to create
additional value which cannot be copied. We
can see this for example in the fashion design
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industry where no intellectual property rights
exist and famous designers can sell their cloth-
ing articles for high prices and generate a high
income even if at the same time fashion com-
panies copy their work and sell the copies for
a much lower price to the masses in their out-
lets.12
The third answer is that economic theory
shows that in most cases it makes sense not to
grant monopoly rights to ensure that the capi-
tal value can be generated. There is always the
risk that no market will exist because no one is
looking for the particular product, or that not
even the capital value can be realised because
there is an oversupply of a particular product.
If we grant monopoly rights to the creator or
inventor then why not as well to the baker and
12. As I mentioned in the introduction, I do not consider trade-
marks as objects from the intellectual property category, even
if they are usually listed there in the literature. My arguments
for the abolition of intellectual property concern patents and
copyrights. Trademarks are for identification purposes. Using
a name from someone else is not using an idea but primarily
cheating about identity. If I am creating a bag which looks
similar to one from Gucci for example, I am copying this cul-
tural expression, which should be allowed from my point of
view. But to put the Gucci logo on it is to pretend it is some-
thing which it is not, in other words lying. This should not be
justified but can be handled through fair trade or competition
law.
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the butcher? De jure monopolies hinder inno-
vation because monopoly holders usually fol-
low a rent-seeking strategy. This is one reason
why we have abandoned feudal and guild sys-
tems in favour of free market systems.
CONTROL RIGHTS
Let us now have a closer look at control rights
for intellectual property. Christman does not
justify control rights in his paper; he just men-
tions that the execution of these rights is not
dependent on the consent of other persons. It
is possible that they can be defended, and for
the sake of our argument we assume here that
they are justified. One important aspect,
though, is that everything that is said about
private property and control rights makes per-
fect sense for physical goods, as they are so-
called rival goods, which means control rights
can only be executed exclusively by one person
at a time. In fact the assertion of such rights
only makes sense because of this characteristic
of rivalry of such goods. If physical goods were
not scarce goods we would not need to think
about ownership and property. This may seem
like a triviality, but it is a very important point
when we analyse the character of intellectual
property.
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A text in a book or a painting on a canvas are
only rival-goods in the sense that the physical
manifestation of the expression cannot be con-
sumed more than once at any given time. The
expression itself is non-rival. It can be con-
sumed by many people at the same time as
long as sufficient copies of the expression exist.
The proponents of the current copyright sys-
tem argue that the justification of intellectual
property shares the same moral grounds as the
justification of physical property.13 But only the
physical medium has a rivalry character com-
parable to the physical goods by which control
rights may be justified. As soon as the copying
of the expression, which is what copyright law
protects, does not need a physical medium
anymore, which means that it can be done at
zero or near zero cost, it loses its rivalry charac-
ter. In other words, copying is not stealing, as
the proponents of intellectual property rights
try to convince us. A printed book for example
can only be read by one person at a time.14 If
someone takes the book away from its owner,
13. In an anti-piracy campaign from 2004 the Motion Picture
Association claimed for example:“you wouldn’t steal a car,
you wouldn’t steal a movie, downloading pirated films is steal-
ing”.
14. Of course it is possible for two or even more people to read the
same copy of a book together, but this is not the purpose of
the book and it would not be a convenient experience.
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he can now read it and the original owner can-
not. What we have here are the typical charac-
teristics of a rival-good where the postulation
of control rights may make some sense. But
this changes completely as soon as a digital
representation of the expression is available.
In this case this would be an E-Book file or a
website with the same text on it. If I possess
an E-Book or have access to text on the World
Wide Web, I am not limited in my enjoyment
of the expression when someone else makes a
copy and reads the text as well. As soon as
the expression is no longer bound to a physical
medium, and its manifestation is realised in a
digital representation, the marginal costs for
the second and subsequent copies are nearly
zero and therefore it loses its rivalry character
and its scarcity.
Against this argument it is said that if the non-
rivalry character of a creative work allows its
use without the consent of the creator as long
as it does not hinder someone else using it at
the same time, it could also be said that a phys-
ical good can be used by anybody for free as
long as no one else needs to use it.
“… that principle as clearly requires that a
hammer should be free to different persons at
different times, and that a road, or canal
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should be free to as many persons at once, as
can use it without collision, as it does that an
idea should be free to as many persons at once
as choose to use it” (Spooner 1855, cited in
Palmer 1990:824)
Spooner’s argument may seem convincing at
first glance, but the non-rivalry character of
digital objects does not derive from the fact
that they can be used by more than one person
at the same time, but from the fact that they
will not be consumed when used. Every time
someone uses a hammer or any other physical
object it wears down a little bit. This is not the
case with digital representations. There is no
consumption of content or cultural artefacts in
the way that causes them to be diminished by
being used. What is consumed is the physical
medium. A printed book gets dog-eared and its
cover becomes worn; not so the E-Book.
It is argued then, by proponents of the current
copyright system, that when someone buys a
book or a painting he does not buy the content
but only the medium and the license to con-
sume the content, which means the creator of
the expression continues to be the owner of his
work. The ownership which is protected by the
copyright law is that of the expression, not the
medium. This is also in line with the so-called
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first sale doctrine from the copyright legal
framework, which means that the buyer of a
medium like a book or a CD can execute all
the private property rights on that medium as
with any other physical product, the control
rights and the income rights, but he has no
property rights on the creative work itself. So
we should not analyse the justification of intel-
lectual property rights based on the physical
medium, but only on the expression itself. I
absolutely agree with this claim and because it
is the expression, in other words the abstract
object, which is the subject matter of intellec-
tual property law, it is not very useful to refer
to concepts from the physical world. If control
rights are justified for physical goods like a
hammer, because controlling or using them
can only be exclusive, it does not follow that
they are justified for abstract objects as well.
It rather looks like there is little ground for
its justification as no exclusivity is needed to
enjoy the benefits which are granted by control
rights.
There is one open question remaining.
This concerns the rights to the capital of the
asset, which are part of the control rights. As I
have mentioned above, the abstract good does
not diminish from its consumption; in fact it
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cannot be consumed in such a way, like an
apple or a hammer can be consumed. As long
as it gets copied, it continues to exist, and as
we are living in a world where, through digital
representation, copying is done at zero or near
zero costs, it will probably get copied. But what
intellectual property law creates is not primar-
ily the possibility of gaining an income from
the capital of my book, but from its consump-
tion. This is comparable to gaining an income
from the fruits of my apple tree. As we have
seen above, I can use the apples from my tree
not because of income rights, but because of
control rights. So why should I not be able to
use the “fruits” of my intellectual works in, for
example, the form of licence fees? We have to
make again a clear distinction between rights
to the capital, which are part of the control
rights, and rights for profit, which are in fact
income rights. The fruits from my apple tree
are mine in the sense that I am the one who
has the right to use, to possess and to control
them. I can also eat them, give them away, sell
them or let them decay. But the right to the
surplus, if I am going to sell them on a market,
is not part of the granted control rights; these
are the concerns of the income rights and these
are, in the case of intellectual property, con-
tested as we have seen above and will see fur-
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ther below. So it is important not to mix up
these different aspects of property rights. The
fruits of my apple trees are finite and they are
part of the capital; the ‘fruits’ of my creative
work are infinite as there is no consumption
in the way that something diminishes with its
use. There is no comparable concept like trees
with fruits for cultural artefacts and inven-
tions. Or in other words, there are no apples
growing from creative works. This does not
hinder the creator, by the way, in generating
an income from creative works, as I have men-
tioned in the income rights section with the
fashion industry example. In fact it does not
hinder anyone: as they do not get used up, they
can be exploited by everyone without limita-
tions. We will discuss the implications of this
aspect in detail in Chapter Four.
Where have now reached? We have seen in this
section that the surplus which can be gener-
ated in a market is not related to the labour
someone has put into his work. As intellectual
property justification is often based on a nat-
ural law argument which refers to Locke’s
labour-mixing metaphor and the concept of
self-ownership, it is important to point out that
it cannot be argued that the creator has
deserved the surplus from his de jure monop-
45 ANDREAS VON GUNTEN
oly rights because of his labour. A seller in a
market may deserve his profit, however, but
this desert is not what is considered to be the
grounds for the natural law justification of
intellectual property rights. We have further
seen that one cannot justify these rights from
the control rights bundle as these rights do not
make much sense for abstract objects which do
not diminish through use. They are non-rival,
as the economist says. I do expect that one
could still argue that although the creator does
not deserve his monopoly rights solely because
he has put his labour into his work and the
natural law justification does not hold, he may
nevertheless deserve it because he is the cre-
ator or the inventor, the person who has
realised himself and the cultural expression or
the invention through his creativity. We will
tackle this challenge in the next chapter, which
concerns personality-based justifications of
intellectual property rights.
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3. THE MYTH OF THE
INDIVIDUAL CREATOR
T he personality rights justifications ofintellectual property are, as we haveseen in Chapter One, based on the main
premise that the creator is the legitimate owner
of the results of his creative work, because his
personality is realised through his creative
work. Supporters of the self-ownership thesis
who believe that I might be right with my argu-
ment in Chapter Two, that the creative agent
does not deserve the surplus from market
transactions because of the labour he has put
into his work, but that full self-ownership also
implies that ideas are owned by the self-owner,
would insist that ideas and expressions emerge
from individual’s brains and therefore are
owned by these individuals exclusively. But
this individual creator concept includes two
hidden premises. First, it requires that the cre-
ator is the sole source of this work in such a
way that the result of his creative work can
be attributed to him alone;1 and second that
in fact he himself as an active and responsible
agent is the creator of the work. We will now
examine these two hidden premises in more
detail.
THE CREATOR AS A MEME COPY
MACHINE
We usually think of every cultural expression
as a result of one or more person’s labour. But
it is more than just ‘labour’ that we attribute
as the input factor for the result of a creative
process. It is a kind of extraordinary creativity,
which not every person is fortunate enough to
have. For some it is even the divinity which
talks to us, through the creator. Our perception
of the artist is often that of a genius. But is
the creator then really a creator in the sense
of being a creative agent, or is he just a means
to represent and reproduce what the ‘Zeitgeist’,
God or his unconsciousness creates? Is the
inventor really an inventor or is he just an
explorer of what is already there? In other
1. There are also situations where a work is attributed to more
than one person, like multiple authors for a text, or the com-
poser and the lyricist for a song. But for the sake of simplicity
I always talk about one creator.
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words, is creativity something where we act as
active agents, or is it something which just hap-
pens unconsciously inside our neural system?
In the closing chapter of his 1976 book, The
Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins introduces his
postulate of the meme (Dawkins 2006).2 In
1991 Daniel Dennett used this concept as an
important building block for his account of
how human consciousness can be understood
from a materialist perspective (Dennett 1993).
The term “meme” is an abbreviation of the
ancient Greek word “mimeme” which stands
for ‘imitator’. A meme is a cultural expression,
or a behaviour which reproduces itself while
jumping from brain to brain. This happens
through human imitation. Imitation is the
building block of human culture and tradition.
The brain is the copy machine for the memes.
Cultural evolution occurs, like biological evo-
lution, as soon as there is information which
shows variation, selection and heredity.
Memes get copied by imitation. During this
copy process they are sometimes changed only
slightly, and sometimes they are recombined
2. Memes as they are used in this paper and by the proponents
of a meme theory are not be confused with the same name for
Internet phenomena which are shared widely through social
networks. For a comprehensive account of meme theory see
Blackmore (1999).
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with other memes, which leads to variation.
Some memes are more successful in getting
copied than others, which gives us selection.
For example the idea of nations and states was
more successful than the idea of a society with-
out authorities; the idea of a person-like God
was more successful than the pantheistic or
animistic world views, or the story of two
lovers who are not allowed to come together
and eventually commit suicide is told in differ-
ent variations and settings over centuries, and
so on.
The concept of the meme is important for our
analysis of intellectual property because it
gives us a framework to explain cultural evolu-
tion as an interpersonal process from which we
cannot postulate one individual as the exclu-
sive creator of a creative work. Ideas cannot
realise themselves without brains, but brains
are not the creators of ideas, they are just the
hosts for the replication process. Even if an
individual person recombines different
memes, which is more common than the sim-
ple copying from one meme, it is still a copying
process, which we cannot really operate our-
selves actively. It just happens with us, inside
our brains. As I am writing this text, I am not
really in charge in the sense that I decide which
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memes I am taking and combining with others.
I do of course have the experience of ‘thinking
myself,’ but this is not what actually happens
inside my brain according to Daniel Dennett
(1991).3 Everything I write here is the result
of a continuous meme copying and recombina-
tion process. One association leads to another.
The river of consciousness is full of surprises
which I cannot claim myself as an active agent
to be responsible for, in the sense that I can
insist on an exclusive property right for what
comes out of my brain.4 Artists also often talk
about having the sense of not being in charge
while creating their artwork. They emphasise
that they don’t know how it comes about that
they are creative. They usually are not aware of
what is going on in their consciousness while
creating a piece of art, or at least are not able
to explain it. It is common that they talk about
inspiration on which they depend and that one
has to wait until it arrives. Sometimes it does
not arrive at all. The idea of the need to
be inspired by outside forces to be able to be
creative can be traced back to the Muses of
3. Dennett’s materialistic account of how consciousness should
be understood is contested, but I assert that a theory for an
interpersonal process of creativity could also be developed on
the basis of idealism.
4. This does not mean that I do not have free will, as we will see
later.
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Greek mythology. The romantic concept of art,
which emphasises that the genius has the ben-
efit to let the divine express itself through the
artist, also leads to the idea that the genius
himself is not in charge here, but something
else is. Human beings and their memes are
living in a symbiotic system. Cultural expres-
sions seem to be continuously replicated inside
brains, and from brain to brain, so to speak.
Each copy is slightly different from its original
and is at the same time another original for the
next replication procedure. This is important
because it shows that all expressions are equal
in the sense that they are all copies and origi-
nals at the same time. We should not imagine
memes as singular representations of expres-
sions or ideas in our brain though. They are
rather complex compositions of many different
aspects and attributes of them in different
places and at different times as Daniel Dennett
explains in his multiple drafts model (Dennett
1991:111ff).
THE CREATIVE PROCESS AS A
COLLECTIVE PROCESS
Because ideas jump from brain to brain in the
form of memes the creative process has to be
seen as a collective process. Every piece of art,
every patent, every musical pattern, every
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behaviour is always the end- and starting point
of a continuous collective process of human
creativity and innovation. Ideas are repre-
sented through expressions. These can be
words, images, music melodies, behaviours
and so on. There are no ideas without repre-
sentation, which means that we cannot com-
municate or experience ideas without them
being expressed somehow. The idea-
expression relationship is far more complex
and controversial than we can discuss in this
paper, but for our purpose (to point to the
mechanism of cultural evolution through copy-
ing) it should be sufficient to understand its
general aspects.
Every expression of a human being is the result
of the recombination of what has been
expressed by someone else and of the meme
copying process inside his neural system. We
have evidence for the collective aspects of cre-
ativity from Ludwik Fleck’s philosophy of sci-
ence. According to Fleck it is not correct to
assume that human beings think individually.
We should accept the fact that ‘cognition is a
collective process’ (Sady 2012).
‘A truly isolated investigator is impossible… An
isolated investigator without bias and tradi-
tion, without forces of mental society acting
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS COMMON
PROPERTY 54
upon him, and without the effect of the evo-
lution of that society, would be blind and
thoughtless. Thinking is a collective activity…
Its product is a certain picture, which is visible
only to anybody who takes part in this social
activity, or a thought which is also clear to
the members of the collective only. What we
do think and how we do see depends on the
thought-collective to which we belong.’ (Fleck
1935b, cited in Sady 2012)
Fleck is stressing here that without mental
content from other members of the thought-
collective we belong to, we would not be able
to give meaning to our thinking. We could also
say that Fleck describes some of the cultural
effects of the meme-replication-process. This
becomes even more apparent when we look at
how Wojciech Sady describes the definition of
Fleck’s thought collective:
‘A thought collective is defined by Fleck as a
community of persons mutually exchanging
ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction
(Fleck 1935a, II.4). Members of that collective
not only adopt certain ways of perceiving and
thinking, but they also continually transform
it—and this transformation does occur not so
much “in their heads” as in their interpersonal
space.’ (Sady 2012)
55 ANDREAS VON GUNTEN
The continuous transformation of ideas in
‘their interpersonal space’ is what we could
also call cultural evolution. And even if Fleck
has provided his account in the special context
of the question of how scientific research
works, we can easily adapt it to the creative
process as such. Not only in science but in
every aspect of creativity, cultural evolution is
at work. Let us imagine in a short thought
experiment a human being born on an island,
where his parents have died right after his
birth. Somehow he has managed to survive and
he is living now as an adult alone on this island.
It is rather unlikely that he has started to paint
images in his leisure time, but for the sake of
the argument, let us assume he did. But what
seems to be rather implausible is that he paints
images in the style of cubism without any
social interaction or cultural heritage. Cubism
is a typical example of a phenomenon of cul-
tural evolution and at the same time an exam-
ple of how our society tends to attribute cul-
tural innovations to individuals even if there is
much evidence that it is more an emergence of
the “Zeitgeist” than a creative event by a sin-
gle genius. Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque
are usually said to be the inventors of cubism,
while at the same time it is considered as a
fact in art history that there were different pre-
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decessors and influences which prepared the
ground to let the new movement arise. We can
consider the members of the cubist movement
as a thought collective in Ludwik Fleck’s sense
and adapt his findings to the process of art pro-
duction. Even if we consider Pablo Picasso to
be one of the most important artists of cubism
it does not seem very probable that he would
have created the same type of paintings had
he lived in the eighteenth century or had he
been raised by a worker family in Manchester
around 1850. And it also does not seem very
likely that cubism would not have evolved if
Pablo Picasso had never lived at all.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that it was
Picasso who painted Les Demoiselles
d’Avignon and not some thought collective.
There is at least a substantial individual part in
the creative works of artists of any kind. There
is no artwork without the decision of the artist
to start working on it. If he decided to plant
trees instead of creating a piece of art, there
would be no painting, song or text we could
enjoy and analyse. This is definitely true, but
the question is, is this enough to consider him
as the only source of the result and to provide
him therefore with the rights to exclusively
exploit the benefits from it? It is undeniable
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that there lies labour in every cultural artefact,
and this labour can usually be attributed to
the creators. It was Pablo Picasso who moved
the paint brushes to create his Les Demoiselles
d’Avignon and not Paul Cézanne. But the fact
that this picture looks how it looks cannot be
attributed to Picasso alone.
Let us assume the meme model and the
thought collective are adequate conceptual
descriptions for how human expressions and
ideas evolve interpersonally. It still can be said
that what we call being creative is what is new
or original, and that this is exactly what the
individual aspect of creativity represents. The
problem here lies in the question: what is to
be considered as new or original? As we have
seen in the case of cubism, even when we can
assign a new category to an artistic style, it
has not evolved out of nothing. The borders of
such categories are always blurred and arbi-
trary, and they fade away as soon as we try to
find them. And even what we consider as radi-
cally new and original in the history of our cul-
ture, like cubism, or as another example the
theory of relativity formulated by Albert Ein-
stein, can be traced back to former works by
other individuals which were necessary foun-
dations for Picasso or Einstein to make their
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discoveries. There is never anything radically
or totally new in human culture. Every cultural
expression evolves slowly from its predeces-
sors. Evolutionary steps are very small: so
small that they usually are not detected. It is
the last straw that breaks the camel’s back. The
famous big theories, the so-called new inven-
tions in art or the great discoveries in science
are always results of long-lasting interpersonal
creative and evolutionary processes. It looks as
though it is mere luck that the memes are com-
bined in a particular way inside a neural sys-
tem from a specific individual and not through
someone else’s. Of course, the artist or the sci-
entist has often contributed a lot of personal
education and work to bring themselves into
the position to be able to make this very last
important step for a new discovery or a new
kind of cultural work. But it remains a small
step compared to the whole process which was
needed before he could take this step. Albert
Einstein knew this as well. He said at a meeting
of the National Academy of Science in 1921:
When a man after long years of searching
chances on a thought which discloses some-
thing of the beauty of this mysterious universe,
he should not therefore be personally cele-
brated. He is already sufficiently paid by his
experience of seeking and finding. In science,
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moreover, the work of the individual is so
bound up with that of his scientific predeces-
sors and contemporaries that it appears
almost as an impersonal product of his gener-
ation. (Einstein 1921:579)
The creator or author is far from being passive
in this process. As we have seen above, it was
Picasso who painted his paintings and it was
Einstein who wrote his papers. So there is def-
initely an important individual part in every
cultural work. But when we take the collective
aspect of the creative process we have sketched
so far into consideration, it looks like it just
does not seem to be justified to attribute the
originality to the individual by whom it was
expressed. The person who creates a work
should not be seen as its author or creator but
more as its source. This kind of attribution
gives respect to the individual part without
stressing it too far. There are many practical
reasons to attribute the work to a source. It
helps others to refer to it, it may help to under-
stand it better, it may even help to give some
other kind of reward (e.g. money) to its source.
But just because we are the source of a piece
of work, we cannot thereby claim that we are
the single author or creator and therefore the
owner of it. Such a treatment of the work is
also in line with Kant’s account of the person-
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ality rights of an author. While attributing the
source of an expression, we esteem the individ-
ual part one has on the creation of a cultural
expression without making him the sole cre-
ator and exclusive owner.
Both the postulation of a meme theory and the
concept of the thought collective may lead to
several objections. The most important is that
the concept of free will may not be compatible
with these views. Meme theory as proposed by
Daniel Dennett has to be considered as a mate-
rialistic theory of the mind. Materialistic theo-
ries of the mind and the concept of the thought
collective can be called deterministic in their
character. It is disputed whether free will is
compatible with determinism or not, and we
cannot discuss this question in this paper. And
it is true that if we hold the view that free will
exists and that it is not compatible with deter-
minism we have to reject meme theory and
maybe Fleck’s thought collective as well. But
we could still accept that creativity and inno-
vation are more to be perceived as interper-
sonal than individual processes; we just have
to find another theory which is not in conflict
with free will. Anyone who insists on the view
that ideas and expressions are naturally owned
by the individual from whom they occur, must
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also provide a plausible theory as to how minds
produce ideas independently from their social
environment. I do not assert that such a theory
does not exist, but I have not come across one
yet. But if we accept that we are merely a
source rather than a creator of cultural expres-
sions, and if the only thing which we can take
into account for intellectual property rights is
the labour we have contributed and not the
creativity itself, there seems to be little ground
for any personality-based account of intellec-
tual property rights. The only hope for the jus-
tification of the personal property of cultural
expressions and inventions lies now in the util-
itarian arguments, which are the ones we are
going to examine in the following chapter.
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4. A JUST SOCIETY
WITH INTELLECTUAL
COMMONS
T here are two main opposing concep-tions of how a just society ought to look.One strand stresses the aspect of indi-
vidual freedom whereas the other focuses on
equal distribution of natural resources. There
have been attempts to reconcile these views,
for example by John Rawls (1999). I will show
in this last chapter that the concept of intellec-
tual commons can be endorsed from both
sides.
As we have seen in the previous chapters, there
are good reasons to claim that neither natural
rights nor personality rights arguments pro-
vide enough justification for intellectual prop-
erty rights of the sort implemented today
through a repressive global legal framework.
So there is only the utilitarian argument left —
which says that granting intellectual property
rights serves the just society as such, as out-
lined in Chapter One. I assert that for all types
of just society it is desirable that human com-
munication, cultural productivity and scientific
progress serve the development of society in
a sustainable way. Sustainability here means
that the just society can be developed in line
with its values while maintaining its resources
for the following generations. There is dis-
agreement of course about values, and about
how resources can be maintained in such a
way. There is also a lot of disagreement about
whether a political structure is needed, how
such a structure should be constructed, and
how much interference with individual free-
dom would be acceptable to create wealth
equality amongst its members. And values are
of course not static but are always in slight
modification. My aim is not to try to solve these
fundamental problems but to show that a soci-
ety where intellectual property is common
property has a better chance to prosper, inde-
pendently of the question whether its basic val-
ues are more libertarian or more egalitarian.
The premise is that the more cultural artefacts
and the more scientific ideas are developed and
produced, and the more freely human commu-
nication can happen, the more sustainable a
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society grows. This is the classical liberal argu-
ment for freedom of speech.1 Supporters of
intellectual property rights argue that because
these temporary monopoly rights are granted,
more cultural artefacts are produced (Moore
2011). There would be less medical research
without patents and fewer new books, songs
or movies without copyright, because exclusive
income rights are a necessary incentive for
individuals to be creative. This is an empirical
argument and there are many observations
which show us that there is not much evidence
for its truth.
THE MISSING EVIDENCE FOR THE
INCENTIVE ARGUMENT
First of all, there exists a huge body of cultural
and scientific artefacts which have not been
created to gain monetary incentives but just
because of personal intrinsic motivation. There
are millions of musicians, writers, painters,
photographers out there, who create wonderful
pieces of artwork every day. But they are not
doing it because intellectual property rights are
granting them exclusive income rights on their
works. Personal interest, fun, social integration
1. The most famous version of this statement is given by John
Stuart Mill in his essay ‘On Liberty’ (2011 [1859]).
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and gratification, and many other reasons are
the drivers for their creativity. In fact, there
are many signs from the findings of psychology
and neuroscience that to be creative is a hard-
wired part of the human condition. A look back
in history shows us that a huge body of knowl-
edge and cultural artefacts was produced long
before intellectual property rights were estab-
lished globally and that the intellectual prop-
erty regime does not seem to be the driver for
innovation, as its proponents from the media,
pharmaceutical and software industries often
claim.2 Most of the radical works of the
Enlightenment were published – except in
England – without copyright protection. A
comparative economic study of the develop-
ment of the market for printed books in Eng-
land (with copyright protection) compared
with Germany (without copyright protection)
has revealed that all indicators which are rel-
evant to the justification of copyright show a
negative impact. The average price of books
was lower, there were more books produced
and more people read books in Germany com-
pared to England between 1710 and 1850
2. For an overview of how corporate interests have influenced
the development of the actual global legal framework of intel-
lectual property rights see for example Drahos (2002) and
Drahos (1996)
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(Höffner 2010:386-388). An analysis of exhi-
bition data from the period of the industrial
revolution showed that patent rights were not
the driving factor of the scientific and technical
development. Instead:
“Historical evidence suggests that in countries
with patent laws, the majority of innovations
occur outside of the patent system. Countries
without patent laws have produced as many
innovations as countries with patent laws dur-
ing some time periods, and their innovations
have been of comparable quality. Even in
countries with relatively modern patent laws,
such as the mid-nineteenth-century United
States, most inventors avoided patents and
relied on alternative mechanisms when these
were feasible.” (Moser 2013:40)
Another more recent example is open source
software and the open knowledge movement.
Thousands of programmers have created the
world’s most-used software stack for servers
in the Internet without the exploitation of
monopoly rights. The Linux operating system,
the Apache web server and many other pro-
grams have been created not because of intel-
lectual property rights, but because some
human beings found it important to do so.
Hundreds of thousands of voluntary editors
have created Wikipedia, the most comprehen-
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sive encyclopedic work in human history with
more than 30 million articles in 207 lan-
guages3. There are millions of photographs and
illustrations which are published under the
creative-commons licences, which allow the
copying and reuse of the material without ask-
ing for permission. Most scientific writings are
not copyright protected because the
researchers asked for it or wanted to make a
profit, but because the publishers want to
exploit public resources. More and more
researchers are beginning to publish their
work through open access publications which
often use the creative-commons licenses as
their legal framework. Public research funding
organisations have also begun to demand open
access publications and no one, not even the
publishing houses, would assert that there is
a risk that scientists would stop researching if
their works were freely available.4
3. As of august 2014
4. The situation today is still that almost all academic research
publications are copyright protected although the costs for the
research and most often also for the publication are funded by
public money. Academic institutions, libraries and private
researchers have to pay a high price to the publishing houses
to get access to the newest research material. This way the
public pays twice, first to create the research results and sec-
ond to access them, all in the name of copyright protection
justified by utilitarian arguments.
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One strong objection against my argument,
that innovation and creativity occur also when
there is no intellectual property protection, is
that it could still be the case that there is more
innovation and creative output with private
intellectual property than without. Even
though it is hard to prove, as we cannot test
two social situations which differ only in their
intellectual property regimes, there is evidence
from historical comparative economic studies
that this would not be the case. As we have
already seen above, there were more books
produced and sold in Germany without copy-
right than in England with copyright protec-
tion between 1750 and 1850. In an analysis
of different historical studies about the eco-
nomic implications of patents Michele Boldrin
and David K. Levine came to this conclusion:
“To sum up, careful statistical analyses of the
nineteenth century’s available data, carried out
by distinguished economic historians, uni-
formly shows two things. Patents neither
increase the rate of innovation nor are the best
instrument to maximize inventor’s revenue.”
(Boldrin: 2008:216)
As I wrote above, I do not assert that such find-
ings can clearly disprove that there is more
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innovation and creative output with intellec-
tual property, but they definitely give us
important evidence to dispute the thesis.
LIBERTARIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR
INTELLECTUAL COMMONS
A just society, from a libertarian point of view,
gives individuals equal rights to maintain and
develop a life according to their own desires.5
If the distribution of resources has developed
from free and consensual transactions, it is
just6. In a world where intellectual property
is individual property, only a few have access
to the income rights of the ideas and cultural
expressions which are appropriated by a ‘cre-
ator.’ And these few are not entitled to this
benefit because they gain it through monopoly
rights granted by the state. In a world in which
intellectual property is common property, all
ideas and cultural expressions are available to
everyone. As we have discussed at several
places in this essay, I am not questioning the
self-ownership thesis. In fact this thesis is com-
patible with my argument for common intel-
lectual property. I have shown in Chapter Two
5. For an overview of Libertarianism see for example Vallentyne
(2014).
6. This is the right-libertarian view, left-libertarians dispute this.
Sell also Steiner (2000).
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that we can question the natural law justifica-
tion for intellectual property rights while still
accepting the self-ownership claim that one
owns one’s body, talents and labour. And in
Chapter Three we saw that we may need to
revise our perception that an individual has
a moral right to claim ideas as his property
even if we do not question his self-ownership
as such.
One could argue though that for libertarians
private property rights are essential rights for
a just society, and therefore the idea of not
allowing private intellectual property can
never be endorsed by them. Besides the fact
that there are also left-libertarian concepts
which question the idea of full private property
rights,7 we should keep in mind that intellec-
tual property rights create rights over abstract
objects and their justifications can be con-
tested. To question intellectual property rights
does not mean to question private property as
such. Therefore it is not the case that a society
without an intellectual property rights frame-
work necessarily interferes with the personal
freedom of its people. It is rather the other way
around. Intellectual property rights are mak-
ing it possible to privately appropriate abstract
7. See also Vallentyne (2014) and Steiner (2000).
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objects which otherwise would be in the com-
mons. They create an artificial scarcity which
otherwise would not exist. In a world without
private intellectual property, every person
would be able to innovate freely and to be cre-
ative without the interference of others. This
is not the case today. I am not allowed to put
a video, showing me playing a satirical cover
version of Michael Jacksons ‘Billie Jean,’ on
my website. I am not allowed to write a ‘Gone
with the Wind’ version from another perspec-
tive. I am not allowed to create an online shop
using a ‘one-click’ check-out process, as this
is patented by an online retailer in the U.S.8
These are just a few examples, and it is true
that I might be allowed to do all this, if I asked
for permission, but we can easily see that such
a system reduces my freedom to innovate. In a
world without private intellectual property, no
one is discriminated against. It is true that in
such a society someone other than the creator
or inventor can also take part of the income
which can be generated from a particular
invention or work of art. But as long as no one
is prevented from doing the same, there is no
problem with that from a libertarian point of
view.9 It is also probable that in such a soci-
ety we would not see the same accumulation
8. US Patent No. US5960411 (A) for Amazon.com Inc.
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of capital from inventions and cultural arte-
facts because of the lack of monopoly rights.
Instead of having just a few big pharmaceutical
companies we probably would see thousands
of small ones, as the ideas for new health prod-
ucts would be copied all over the world in a
short period of time. In other words, intellec-
tual commons would massively increase the
speed of the dissemination of ideas, far more
than in the actual private property system. It
is said that less medical research would take
place without the incentives from monopoly
rights, especially because it is so expensive to
invent a new medical therapy and bring it into
the market. Besides the fact that there are also
other possible ways to pay the pharmaceutical
industry for its effort,10 it is important to con-
sider the possibility that the ways in which the
funding of the research works, or how the
processes to approve a new medical therapy
are implemented, can be changed to adapt to a
world without intellectual property, if needed.
In particular, digitalisation and global connec-
tivity over the Internet reduce the need for
hierarchical organisations to run ambitious
9. Some left-libertarians might not agree with that, but we will
look at the questions concerning egalitarian redistribution
claims in the next chapter.
10. see Pogge (2008)
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projects. I recall again the open source soft-
ware movement, which creates the same type
of complex products in collaborative networks
as big companies do in hierarchical environ-
ments.
In a just free-market economy as it is endorsed
in the libertarian literature, no one is pre-
vented from participating in the market either
as a buyer or as a supplier.11 There is also no
hindrance to gathering the information needed
to make rational decisions. Such a market is
highly competitive. One important aspect of
intellectual property rights is that they grant
monopoly rights through the state. Such types
of de jure monopolies should not be confused
with temporary de facto monopolies which
arise because of innovation and competitive
advantage. In a free market economy de facto
monopolies cannot stand for long if they are
trying to generate profits above production
costs. And even if they could, as long as they
are evolved through a series of consensual
market transactions, they are not unjust (Noz-
ick, 1974). De jure monopolies are unjust
because they limit the rights of other potential
sellers to enter the market and they are inef-
ficient because they hinder competition. Egal-
11. see Nozick (1974) for example, or Vallentyne (2014)
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itarians and left-libertarians would disagree
here and claim that unequal distribution of
worldly resources is unjust even if it is the
result of consensual transactions.12 If de jure
monopoly rights help to create less inequality,
they may be justified according to them. We
will discuss the question of whether intellec-
tual property rights can be justified from an
egalitarian point of view in the next section.
That intellectual property rights are not to be
considered as monopoly rights is another
objection which can be stated. As long as there
are substitutes availiable in a market, one can-
not talk about a monopoly. Intellectual prop-
erty is property like any other property in the
physical world. So the fact that Gillette does
not let you use its patents for their razor is in
the same category as the fact that they do not
let you use their fabrication lines. This is not a
question of monopoly but a question of prop-
erty rights. The same can be said about copy-
right. The book or the movie markets are very
competitive. There are hundreds of thousands
of new books published each year. One can-
not say that consumers have no choice, and
if an author does not let you use their work
for a remix or a translation, it is the same as
12. See Rawls (1999), Vallentyne (2014)
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when he does not let you live in his writing
house in Ireland. The argument that intellec-
tual property rights are not about monopolies
but about property, as convincing as it sounds,
is begging the question. The type of property to
which intellectual property rights are applied
are cultural expressions of any sort, which are
abstract objects. These objects as we have seen
are by nature not scarce, and they do not lose
any of their attributes when they are used by
many people, unlike physical objects. An
abstract object has in fact none of the attrib-
utes that can be ascribed to physical objects.
Only after the application of intellectual prop-
erty rights, through the granting of monopoly
privilege, does an abstract object achieve some
of the property attributes that are available for
physical objects. Monopolies are not attributes
of properties but of markets. Intellectual prop-
erty rights grant the rights holders the exclu-
sive rights to exploit the profits which can be
created in the market for this cultural expres-
sion. It is true that property rights for physical
products do usually also include the same type
of monopoly rights for such a product, but as
this product is a single instance, one cannot
talk about a market for that single instance of
this product. When I am the owner of an apple,
it is true, I have as a side effect of my property
77 ANDREAS VON GUNTEN
rights also a de jure monopoly right for this
particular apple. But there is no market for this
particular apple, only for apples in general. I
can sell my apple only once and then I have
to pass it over to the buyer. No one would say
that a monopoly right has been granted for the
exploitation of their apple to this seller. The
situation is different in the market for cultural
artefacts. In the case of books, for example, we
often talk about the market for books, which
includes all book titles which can be bought.
But from the author’s, and also most often
from the reader’s perspective, there is rather
the market for a particular book title. A mem-
ber of the vegan community may want to buy
a particular vegan cookbook and it does not
help him much that there are also a lot of meat
cookbooks on the market. An author of a fic-
tional story is mostly interested in how many
of his books have been sold and not much in
how the overall book market has developed.
There is no doubt that every individual cultural
artifact has, unlike every individual apple, its
own market. And intellectual property rights
are granted monopoly rights to exploit that
particular market exclusively.
It is important to clarify here that even without
the de jure monopoly rights, a creator is not
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hindered from gaining profits from his cultural
expression or invention; he just has to face
more competition. It is even possible that he
creates a temporary de facto monopoly just
because of some other advantages he may have
over his competitors. An author, for example,
or a musician may create a market not for a
particular song or a particular book, but for
all expressions coming exclusively from him.
Even if there are hundreds of bands which
cover AC/DC songs, the particular band AC/
DC still play their concerts for very high-price
tickets in big concert venues all over the world.
Only if there are no de jure monopoly rights in
the form of intellectual property rights is a real
market with many sellers and buyers possible.
In such a market, all suppliers have the same
chance to differentiate the product or the ser-
vices around it and find their customers. Such
a situation would most probably lead to more
innovation than the current system,13 and
more innovation is what the utilitarian justifi-
cation for intellectual property rights claims as
its reason.
13. This is an empirical statement like the statement from the
proponents of the current system that intellectual property
rights leads to more innovation. We have discussed already in
this chapter that there is evidence that this claim may not be
true and that even more innovation and creative works are
produced without intellectual property.
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We have not discussed whether a free market
is a just market. That is not part of this work.
What I have shown here is that there is not
much room for proponents of a free market
economy to justify intellectual property as they
are granting de jure monopolies to its rights
holders. Now we are going to analyse whether
there is such a justification for the supporters
of governmental redistribution of the profits
gained in free markets on egalitarian grounds.
EGALITARIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR
INTELLECTUAL COMMONS
A just society from an egalitarian point of view
gives individuals, in addition to equal rights to
maintain and develop a life according to their
own desires, equal access to worldly resources,
such that the rules for distributing the
resources equally amongst its members can
overrule the personal freedom of the individ-
ual14. As we have seen above, intellectual prop-
erty rights are monopoly rights which grant a
temporary privilege to exclusively exploit
income rights from abstract objects which are
14. Some egalitarians would say, that positive freedom is
increased through equal distribution even if negative freedom
may be limited. See also Carter (2003)
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created collectively. Nevertheless there are sev-
eral possible arguments to justify these rights
on egalitarian grounds.
First, it could be argued that these privileges
are not arbitrary. They are granted to individu-
als who deserve them, because they are the cre-
ators or inventors. It is not individuals with the
most money who get the monopoly rights from
the state, but those who are willing to bring
their ideas into existence in form of expres-
sions. If a privilege for creators serves the goal
of getting a more equal distribution of wealth,
it can be justified. A second point is that social
justice from the egalitarian point of view needs
state-enforced redistribution of goods, and
therefore the state needs an intellectual prop-
erty rights framework to redistribute the prof-
its which can be raised from abstract objects.
And a third argument would be that intellec-
tual property rights are rights which help the
individual creator against exploitation by pow-
erful corporations or other organisations.
While discussing these arguments, we should
be aware that we tend to apply distribution
problems from physical objects to abstract
objects. And in the world of physical objects
and a private property rights-based society, we
do in fact face the problems which come with
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unequal appropriation of worldly resources.
An individual who has more talent may be able
to appropriate resources faster than others, so
that in the end there is nothing left. Today,
there is not one square foot of land on our
planet which is not ‘owned’ by someone.
Whether the owner is an individual or a col-
lective of some sort, there is always someone
who claims ownership. Land and every other
worldly resource are finite15 and therefore
there is always a struggle about the question of
to whom they belong.
But in the case of abstract objects, the situation
is totally different. The use of abstract objects
like cultural expressions, ideas, inventions and
so on is not limited simply because someone
else is using them, as we have discussed
already. If I build my house on a piece of land,
and someone wants to do the same on the same
piece of land, he has to send me packing. He
then has the land and I don’t. If I invent a
wheel and use it for my convenience, I can
share this invention without reducing its value
for me. In fact any invention and any expres-
sion can be shared by anyone without dimin-
15. There are worldly resources which can be considered as
renewable, like plants, but they depend on land, which is
finite.
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ishing its utility for others. The value for me
also does not reduce if someone who has more
capital at his disposal than I do is able to pro-
duce wheels to sell them on a market. I can
still use my own wheel, which I have created.
There is even a chance that the producer of the
wheels innovates on it and makes it better, and
as he cannot claim intellectual property rights
either, I am able to use his ideas to upgrade my
wheel as well. If there is a demand for wheels,
chances are high that I will still be able to find
my market for my handmade wheels, even if a
lot of other ‘wheel makers’ are producing them
at lower costs. Buyers do not value only mon-
etary aspects; a lot more is often taken into
account for a buying decision.
In a world with private intellectual property
rights the rights holder can exploit the income
exclusively; in a world with intellectual com-
mons everyone has the chance to do so. From
an egalitarian point of view this fact raises the
problem that the more talented and/or the
more powerful may be able to exploit the prof-
its from the cultural expressions of any kind
much more effectively than the less talented,
whether this is the creator or someone else.
This is partly true, but it is true in any world,
whether there exists a legal framework for
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intellectual monopoly rights or not. We can see
this very well in the actual situation in our
world. Most of the income from intellectual
property rights is concentrated around a few
big players in every market. The main differ-
ence is that the powers are more stable in a
world with intellectual property and more
dynamic in a world without. In a world without
intellectual property rights, monopolies could
still occur but they would be de facto monop-
olies, and these types of monopolies will not
last long. The abolition of intellectual property
rights would lead to a more fragmented and
decentralised economic situation as no one can
be prevented from copying inventions and cul-
tural expressions. Profits will be near zero for
those who just copy and will be higher for
those who innovate on the copy.
Intellectual property rights are not an effective
instrument for redistribution of income or
wealth. From an egalitarian point of view the
problem of inequality persists, and as intellec-
tual property rights are monopoly rights they
create even more inequality on one part
between the “winners” and the “losers” inside
the system, but also between rights holders
and users. If we consider the situation that
without intellectual property rights, the use of
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any expression or invention is open to every-
one, we can easily see that in such a world a
much more diverse market would evolve. As
there are no monopoly rights, probably many
more individuals and smaller groups would
use the cultural expressions which are free to
use, and remix them with their own ideas to
create new products and services to make a liv-
ing. With the system of intellectual property
rights which we have in place now, the
exploitation of the inventor or the creator
through big corporations is the reality. Only for
a few ‘superstars’ might the situation be the
other way around. There are two main reasons
for this. First, it is expensive to get and even
more expensive to enforce intellectual property
rights; and second, the big money lies in the
portfolio of rights and not in the single expres-
sion. Even if there are blockbusters which gen-
erate a multiple of the income from the average
‘product’ for the rights holders, it is usually the
backlist, the sum of thousands of single prod-
ucts, which is the important source of a perma-
nent revenue stream for the big rights holders.
But isn’t it the case that the creator gets at least
his share from the revenue stream and with-
out intellectual property rights these compa-
nies could take everything for themselves with-
out even thinking of letting the creator or
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inventor participate? This is true, but for most
creators the share is so small that it does not
contribute to enhancing their economic situa-
tion. In many cases they would be in a better
situation to generate income with their cre-
ations if they had not exclusively sold the
licences for the exploitation of his work to a
single company.
From an egalitarian perspective, the most
important question is: how can wealth be dis-
tributed equally amongst the people? The
intellectual property rights regime obviously
does not contribute much to solving this prob-
lem; it rather looks like it does the opposite.
I do not argue here that the absence of indi-
vidual intellectual property solves the general
distribution problem, but it leads to a situation
where many more people can benefit from cul-
tural expressions, scientific research and
inventions than now, and therefore less redis-
tribution is needed.
THE CREATIVE WORK AS A COMMON
GOOD
One objection against the abolition of private
intellectual property raises the question of how
the creative worker or inventor can make his
living, when there are no property rights to
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protect his work from exploitation by others.
It is often added that the creator or the inven-
tor should have his fair wage for his labour
like every other craftsman does. These are two
different points and should be handled sepa-
rately. First, as I have mentioned already, the
creator is not hindered at all in generating an
income from cultural artefacts or inventions.
In fact the lack of intellectual property rights
makes it impossible to hinder him from mak-
ing something valuable for other people out of
all cultural expressions, not only his. This gives
him much more opportunity to generate an
income. It is true that some business models
would not work anymore, for example the pay-
per-use model, which is widely implemented
but massively under pressure since the dissem-
ination of digital technology and the Internet.
But others can arise and can be realised, mod-
els which are based on personal services and
engagement. But, and this is important also
for the second point from above, there can be
no right to get an income from any business
model, product or service someone wants to
conduct or sell. There is no moral right for the
artist to claim that he has done some work and
therefore he wants to get paid for it. Imagine
a small village with three bakeries in place,
where these three bakers can all make a good
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living from selling their bread to the inhabi-
tants of this village. Now, a new baker arrives
in town and opens a fourth bakery but the
economy of the village does not provide
enough consumers to pay four instead of three
bakers. The inhabitants continue to buy their
bread from the three traditional producers.
The new baker does not sell one loaf. Of course
no one would say that as he has put a lot of
labour into it he shall get his fair wage for his
work. It is just that he has no market for his
bread in this village. He has either to go and
find a place where he can sell his bread or find
something else which is lacking at this place.
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CONCLUSION
I ntellectual property rights are monopolyrights that grant their holders the tempo-rary privilege for the exclusive exploitation
of the income rights from cultural expressions
and inventions. There must be good reasons
for a society to grant such privileges to some of
its individuals, and therefore the proponents of
these rights have provided three widely
accepted justifications to defend the interwo-
ven global intellectual property rights regime
we have in place today.
To argue for the abolition of intellectual prop-
erty rights we have to challenge all three justi-
fications. Therefore we have discussed whether
a creator or inventor can be considered as the
owner of an expression or an innovation
because he is the individual who created or
invented something. We have seen that two
components are usually mentioned as justifica-
tions for such individual ownership. First, the
natural law based justification which, based on
self-ownership and Lockean appropriation
theories, states that the creator is the owner of
his creation because he has put his own labour
into his work. In analysing the property con-
cept with John Christman’s distinction
between control and income rights, we have
seen that the amount of labour one puts into
a product is not connected to the surplus one
may generate on a market. This does not mean
that a seller on a market has not merited his
profit, but one cannot say that he deserves it
because of his labour. And we have also dis-
cussed that control rights do not make much
sense for abstract objects, as they are not
scarce and do not diminish or lose value when
they are used.
Second, the justification by personality rights,
which is on one hand based on the concept
from Immanuel Kant that expressions are
extensions of one’s personality, and on the
other hand that ideas are owned by the self-
owner like his talents, skills or body parts are
owned by him. With the help of Richard
Dawkins’ concept of the meme and Daniel
Dennett’s multiple drafts model, we have seen
that it may be possible that we as individuals
91 ANDREAS VON GUNTEN
are not active agents in the creative process
but rather hosts for the replication of memes,
which create, through variation, selection and
heredity, the building blocks for the cultural
evolution we can witness when we observe the
development of cultural expressions. Ludwik
Fleck’s concept of the thought collective was
another theoretical framework for a discussion
of the interpersonal aspects of creative
processes. All in all, we have seen that it is far
from evident that an individual can be con-
sidered as the owner of the ideas and expres-
sions which emerge from his brain and there-
fore the natural law and personality-based jus-
tifications are contested.
Utilitarians would assert that, even if we accept
that the creative process is a collective process
it is still useful to grant these monopoly rights
to creators and inventors, as with these incen-
tives more innovation would happen than
without, which is better for all and better for
the worst off. I have replied to this important
argument, and we have seen that different
comparative economic studies have revealed
that there is probably more innovation in soci-
eties without intellectual property law com-
pared to societies with such laws in place.
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We have also seen that for free market propo-
nents monopoly rights are hardly to be justi-
fied, as they are based on state interference,
and that even egalitarians could subscribe to
the abolition of intellectual property rights, as
they do not contribute to more equality.
There are many good reasons to question the
justifications for intellectual property rights
and therefore it is time to start the political dis-
cussion about the abolition of these rights to
create a world in which intellectual property is
common property.
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